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INTRODUCTION 
ince the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, the 
state of healthcare has become an increasingly contentious topic in 
U.S. politics. Political divisions are exacerbated when considering how 
to distribute the costs and benefits among taxpayers, and the recently 
enacted Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), which the Republican 
Party pushed through Congress, has only made matters worse. The New 
York Times recently noted two emerging trends in 2018: first, pretax 
poverty rates fell to “11.8[%], the lowest level since 2001”; second, 
uninsured rates rose for the first time since the ACA’s passage in 2010, 
increasing by 0.6% to a total of 27.5 million people lacking health 
insurance.1 The article later observes, however, that although measures 
of poverty show a pretax decrease, the TCJA has resulted in better tax 
outcomes for wealthier taxpayers.2 In other words, while the TCJA 
might have lifted a modest number of individuals out of poverty, the 
gap between the wealthy and the poor continues to grow. Further, 
recent research confirms that the TCJA has produced a negligible 
change in poverty rates, resulting in a reduction from 12.5% to 12.3%.3 
The current administration’s constant insistence that America is 
becoming “great” again is, therefore, relatively unconvincing. 
In fact, a recent presidential proclamation suggests that the U.S. tax 
system can hardly provide for its own citizens, let alone legal 
immigrants. Acknowledging the burden that uninsured individuals 
place upon the U.S. healthcare system, President Trump stated that 
“[i]mmigrants who enter this country should not further saddle our 
healthcare system, and subsequently American taxpayers, with higher 
1 Ben Casselman et al., Share of Americans with Health Insurance Declined in 2018, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/10/business/economy 
/health-insurance-poverty-rate-census.html [https://perma.cc/6DLB-P9XM]. 
2 Id. 
3 MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45971, THE 
IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX ON POVERTY: BEFORE AND AFTER THE 2017 TAX 
REVISION (“TCJA”; P.L. 115-97) 13 (2019). 
S 
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costs.”4 In its proclamation, the White House suggests that 
unreimbursed medical services are causing unmerited emergency room 
visits and longer wait times, driving hospitals toward insolvency, and 
depleting state and federal budgets, thereby forcing taxpayers to 
shoulder these burdens to keep the healthcare system functioning.5 The 
proclamation effectively bars visa-seeking immigrants from entering 
the United States unless they can show proof of adequate insurance 
coverage or sufficient funds to pay for any “reasonably foreseeable 
medical costs.”6 
A former member of the Obama administration predicted that visas 
would be denied to “parents of U.S. citizens based on a snap judgment 
about [the parents’] apparent health” and that “U.S. citizens will be 
separated from their husbands and wives abroad based on a failure to 
demonstrate health insurance coverage or a subjective level of 
wealth.”7 The irony is that if not for the current administration’s efforts 
to undermine the ACA, there would not be so many uninsured U.S. 
citizens—yet the administration now bemoans the burden imposed on 
taxpayers by people of low socioeconomic status who lack health 
insurance. Viewed alongside the TCJA’s tendency to increase wealth 
inequality, it should come as no surprise that despite spending the most 
on healthcare out of any nation in the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the United States continues to 
score significantly lower than other member nations on life expectancy. 
Moreover, U.S. citizens with the highest income are about 20% more 
likely to report being in good health than those with the lowest 
income—a gap that also dwarfs many other nations in the OECD.8 
While this example highlights the complex interplay of immigration, 
healthcare, taxation, and economic inequality, the focus of this 
Comment is much narrower. This Comment will focus on how recent 
changes to the standard deduction under the TCJA have altered the 
charitable behaviors of U.S. citizens. Further, it argues these changes 
will likely cause greater income inequality and worse health outcomes 
for some of the most vulnerable portions of the U.S. population. The 
4 Richard Gonzales, Trump Bars Immigrants Who Cannot Pay for Healthcare, 
N.P.R. (Oct. 4, 2019, 11:09 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/04/767453276/trump-bars 
-immigrants-who-cannot-pay-for-health-care [https://perma.cc/8V46-PBTK].
5 Proclamation No. 9945, 84 Fed. Reg. 53,991 (Oct. 9, 2019).
6 Id. 
7 Gonzales, supra note 4. 
8 OECD, SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2016: OECD SOCIAL INDICATORS 114–17 (2016); 
OECD, SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2019: OECD SOCIAL INDICATORS 110–11 (2019).  
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first section of this Comment will summarize the goals and metrics of 
tax policy. The second section will look at changes in charitable giving 
before and after the TCJA. The third section will explore the havoc 
these changes are wreaking upon the nonprofit sector and their impacts 
upon income inequality and healthcare outcomes. Finally, before 
concluding, this Comment will turn to potential solutions to address the 
issues raised. 
I 
THE GOALS AND METRICS OF TAX POLICY 
There are established criteria for evaluating tax policy. These criteria 
represent the competing demands of fairness, efficiency, and 
administrability.9 Various metrics may be employed to measure each 
criterion, and some are more reliable than others. Before delving too 
deeply into the TCJA’s effect on charitable contributions, it is first 
necessary to explain each criterion and lay out the metrics relied upon 
in this Comment. 
A. Fairness
The first major concern of tax policy is fairness. Two overarching 
principles dictate measures of fairness in the tax realm. The first is the 
benefit principle, which suggests that those who reap the benefits of the 
government service provided should be the same individuals who pay 
the tax.10 This system therefore opposes any redistribution of wealth. 
The second is the ability to pay principle, which suggests that taxes 
should be distributed according to each filer’s ability to pay and is 
reflected in the graduated income tax rates in the U.S.11 Under the 
ability to pay principle, those who earn the most should shoulder the 
largest tax obligation. Research by the Joint Committee on Taxation 
and several other groups suggests that the TCJA achieves the opposite 
result; instead of assessing taxes on an individual’s ability to pay, the 
TCJA will likely reallocate a larger portion of the tax burden to lower-
9 See generally JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX 
SYSTEM AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO TAX REFORM (JCX-36-17) (July 18, 
2017) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM]. 
10 Id. at 38. 
11 Id. 
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income households by the year 2027.12 This raises the question of how 
a taxpayer’s ability to pay ought to be assessed. 
When determining ability to pay, options include looking at annual 
income, lifetime income, or consumption. Experts generally agree that 
annual income is the most common measure of an individual’s ability 
to pay taxes,13 and so it is the metric used in this Comment. Further, 
this Comment will show that changes to the charitable contribution 
deduction decrease fairness under both the benefit and ability to pay 
principles, by denying tax savings to those most likely to be in need 
and by granting the largest tax savings to those who would donate 
anyway and need to rely on charity the least. This introductory glimpse 
at the concept of fairness will, however, resurface later when 
considering potential solutions—namely in increasing audits of the 
wealthy. 
B. Efficiency
The second major concern of tax policy is efficiency. At a basic 
level, a tax is deemed efficient if it does not change taxpayer behavior; 
if behavior does change, the resulting change is deemed an efficiency 
loss.14 The most efficient tax would thus be a “head tax,” one that 
charges, for example, $100 per person annually with no regard to 
income or ability to pay.15 This is because, in theory, it would produce 
no change in taxpayers’ economic behaviors, such as labor or 
investment decisions. In contrast, research has suggested that for each 
percentage point increase in a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate there is a 
corresponding increase in efficiency loss.16 For example, one would 
expect that if earning more income leads to being charged a higher tax 
rate, individuals might change their economic behaviors to earn less so 
as to pay fewer taxes. 
One interesting distinction the Joint Committee on Taxation 
identifies when looking at efficiency is the difference between 
12 WILLIAM R. CLINE, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., THE NEW TAX LAW’S IMPACT 
ON INEQUALITY: MINOR BUT WORSE IF ACCOMPANIED BY REGRESSIVE SPENDING CUTS 
2–3 (2018). 
13 OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 38–39. 
14 Id. at 27–28. 
15 Id. at 27 n.58 (citing Alan J. Auerbach & James R. Hines, Taxation and Economic 
Efficiency, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1347, 1347–1421 (A.J. Auerbach & M. 
Feldstein eds., 2002)). 
16 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, METHODOLOGY AND ISSUES IN MEASURING 
CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS (JCS-7-93) 20–31 (June 14, 1993). 
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economic incidence and statutory incidence. The Joint Committee 
explains as follows: 
The distribution of the economic burden of a tax is referred to as the 
economic incidence of the tax. It is important to distinguish economic 
incidence from statutory incidence. The statutory incidence is borne 
by the people who are legally liable for the tax (generally those who 
are required to write the checks to the government). However, in a 
market economy, these people may not be the ones who suffer a loss 
of economic well-being due to the tax. The economic incidence of 
the tax is borne by the people who experience a loss of economic 
well-being as a result of the tax.17 
The concept of efficiency and the distinction between economic and 
statutory incidence are particularly relevant to the topic at hand. 
Changes in the standard deduction under the TCJA are projected to 
cause significant distortions in charitable behaviors amongst taxpayers; 
people earning a range of incomes will be less likely to make charitable 
contributions for a tax break due to statutory incidence, claiming the 
standard deduction instead. The individuals benefiting from charitable 
organizations, on the other hand, are the ones who bear the economic 
incidence of these changed behaviors. Greater attention will be given 
to efficiency in Parts II and III. 
C. Administrability
The third major concern of tax policy is administrability. 
Administrability is a blanket term for the issues of simplicity, 
administration, and compliance.18 These issues share a common theme 
of ease: the simpler the tax code and its method of administration, 
the fewer resources taxpayers have to devote to filing their returns, 
and the fewer resources the government likely has to spend on 
processing/auditing and engaging in compliance enforcement actions. 
The tax gap is generally a reliable measure of how administrable the 
income tax is. The gross tax gap represents the difference between what 
the I.R.S. theoretically should have raised in revenue, and the revenue 
that was actually reported and paid.19 Data from 2008 through 2010 
showed that an average of 81.7% of taxes were voluntarily reported and 
paid on time.20 By and far, the most significant portion of the tax gap 
(about 63%) is due to underreporting of income on tax returns—an 
17 Id. at 20. 
18 OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 45–46. 
19 Id. at 46. 
20 Id. 
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issue that frequently arises for business owners/self-employed 
individuals without a third party reporting their wages.21 
In theory, a higher standard deduction that results in fewer 
people itemizing their deductions seems as though it would aid 
administrability. Any potential simplification, however, is easily offset 
by the continued handicapping of the I.R.S. due to increasingly 
common government shutdowns and a former hiring freeze.22 Further, 
while the TCJA may have alleviated some complexity on the side of 
filing income tax returns, changes to other parts of the Internal Revenue 
Code (I.R.C.) will likely cancel this out. For example, charitable 
organizations are not only likely to see fewer donations coming in 
under the TCJA, but, due to changes in the tax code regarding certain 
fringe benefits, many nonprofits also had to file Form 990 for the first 
time if, for example, they provided parking passes to employees.23 
While Congress appears to be correcting this issue,24 it highlights some 
of the administrability problems posed by the TCJA and how sloppily 
the legislation was drafted. Because the TCJA is so recent, hard data 
on figures such as the tax gap, administrative efficiency, and so forth 
are difficult to obtain. Administrability is a complex concern—more 
individuals claiming the standard deduction should not in and of itself 
be viewed as a more administrable tax system. 
II 
NONPROFIT CHALLENGES AFTER THE TCJA 
The TCJA has heavily affected the nonprofit sector. This section 
begins by examining the significant role nonprofits play in the U.S. 
economy. Next, it focuses on how changes to the standard deduction 
have made taxpayers less likely to claim the charitable contribution 
deduction and consequently less likely to engage in charitable 
behaviors. Finally, it closes with a look at other changes to the I.R.C. 
under the TCJA that presented additional challenges for nonprofits. 
21 Id. at 47. 
22 See Paul Kiel & Jesse Eisinger, How the IRS Was Gutted, PROPUBLICA 
(Dec. 11, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-irs-was-gutted 
[https://perma.cc/6X4T-DJ98]. 
23 JANE G. GRAVELLE ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45922, TAX ISSUES RELATING TO 
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 4 (2019). 
24 Jim Tankersley & Emily Cochrane, Congressional Negotiators Agree to Extend Some 
Tax Credits and Add to Debt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019 
/12/17/business/congress-tax-breaks-debt.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc 
/2BRH-ZAR7]. 
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A. Significance of the Nonprofit Sector
The nonprofit sector has a significant presence in the U.S. economy 
and plays an important role in providing services the government 
would otherwise be expected to provide. While there are a range of 501 
nonprofit corporations, this Comment focuses specifically on 501(c)(3) 
corporations, otherwise called “public charities,” and, including under 
its umbrella, entities “organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, . . . literary, or educational purposes, [etc.].”25 
Any reference to nonprofits in this Comment should be construed to 
mean 501(c)(3) organizations (as compared to corporations) unless 
expressly stated otherwise. 
There are approximately 1.4 million nonprofits in the U.S.26 
Nonprofits thus play a huge role in the U.S. economy. In 2016 alone, 
the nonprofit sector employed 12.3 million people, paid $826 billion in 
wages, and accounted for $2 trillion of spending in the economy.27 Of 
the 1.4 million nonprofits in the U.S, over 98,000 fall into the 
categories of healthcare, mental health, and hospitals, and if including 
nonprofits devoted to science and technology research or other public 
interest causes, this number would continue to rise.28 While 98,000 is 
a relatively small figure when looking at 1.4 million nonprofits, these 
98,000 nonprofits make up the top two spending subsectors out of all 
501(c)(3) organizations.29 Thus, one might expect that any decrease in 
charitable giving due to the higher standard deduction is likely to hit 
these health-oriented nonprofits the hardest. Further consideration of 
this possibility will be addressed in Part III. 
B. The Standard Deduction
When filing taxes, taxpayers have the option to itemize their 
deductions or claim the standard deduction. Itemizable deductions 
include things such as payments for state and local taxes, mortgage 
interest deductions, or the charitable contribution deduction.30 While 
the standard deduction gives households a flat dollar amount that can 
be deducted from income, households who pay large enough amounts 
25 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
26 NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, NONPROFIT IMPACT MATTERS: HOW AMERICA’S 
CHARITABLE NONPROFITS STRENGTHEN COMMUNITIES AND IMPROVE LIVES 7 (2019). 
27 Id. at 12 (citing JOHN HOPKINS CTR. FOR CIVIL SOC’Y STUD., THE 2019 NONPROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT REPORT (2019), based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
28 Id. at 6. 
29 Id. at 13. 
30 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(3), 164(a)–(b), 170(a)–(b). 
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for state and local taxes, charitable contributions, or other itemizable 
deductions will receive a larger overall deduction if they elect to 
itemize. This subsection will focus on how the TCJA’s changes to the 
standard deduction have made individuals less likely to itemize their 
deductions and therefore less likely to engage in behaviors that would 
earn them itemizable deductions. 
The I.R.C. is notorious for its complexity and seemingly chaotic 
organization of statutory provisions.31 Thus, not surprisingly, while 
this Comment revolves around charitable deductions as outlined in 
I.R.C. § 170, significant focus will also be given to § 63(c)(7)—the
new standard deduction provision added to the Code by the TCJA.
Section 63(c)(7) nearly doubled the standard deduction for filers who
are single (formerly $6,500, now $12,000); married (formerly $13,000,
now $24,000); and heads of household (formerly $9,550, now
$18,000).32 The natural result of this increase is that fewer filers are
electing to itemize deductions, as allowed under § 63(e).33 Without the
incentive to itemize deductions, taxpayers may lose the incentive to
engage in those behaviors that would earn them the itemized
deductions. For example, research suggests that somewhere between
23.8 to 27.3 million tax filers will switch from itemizing deductions
and claim the standard deduction instead.34
In his article An Economic Analysis of the TCJA’s Larger Standard 
Deduction, Alan D. Viard argues that the change fails to make the tax 
system more administrable.35 The standard deduction and those who 
claim it essentially set a floor on reported income—this floor eliminates 
the need for the I.R.S. to verify or track small expenditures and, in 
theory, should produce savings for administration and compliance 
purposes.36 Yet, given the fact that itemizable deductions were created 
to produce societal benefits, the idea of having a floor begins to reveal 
its cracks. In Mr. Viard’s view, the recent increase in the standard 
deduction may have “served as an indirect way to curtail itemized 
deductions that could not be curtailed directly” due to too much public 
31 See Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Z. Osofsky, Constituencies and Control in Statutory 
Drafting: Interviews with Government Tax Counsels, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1291, 1293–97, 
1305–07 (2019). 
32 Alan D. Viard, An Economic Analysis of the TCJA’s Larger Standard Deduction, TAX 
NOTES, Apr. 1, 2019, at 80. 
33 Id. at 81. 
34 Id.; Alex Brill & Derrick Choe, Charitable Giving and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 
AM. ENTER. INST., June 2018, at 3. 
35 Viard, supra note 32, at 84. 
36 Id. 
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support for their existence.37 In other words, Mr. Viard suggests that 
Congress intended to target itemized deductions like the charitable 
deduction. The next subsection will explore other alterations and 
changes to the Code that may support this argument. 
C. Other Changes to the Code Affecting Giving Incentives
Some other changes to the I.R.C. under the TCJA have affected 
giving incentives. Marginal tax rates, otherwise known as the tax rates 
assigned to particular income brackets, were reduced under the TCJA, 
thereby reducing giving incentives. “For example, the reduction in the 
top bracket from 39.6% to 37% would increase the price of giving by 
4% for an itemizer in that bracket (from 0.604 to 0.63).”38 While low- 
to middle-income earners may elect to take the standard deduction and 
lose any incentive for charitable giving, even some of those individuals 
who continue to itemize deductions will see a smaller return on their 
charitable donations. This decrease thereby reduces the incentive for 
all but the wealthiest taxpayers. 
Adjustments to the Code have drawn criticism for moving the 
allowable deduction out of reach for the average U.S. taxpayer and 
directly into the hands of the nation’s wealthy. For example, another 
change to the Code increased allowable deductions for charitable cash 
contributions, stepping the deduction up from 50% to 60% of adjusted 
gross income.39 Combined with the increased standard deduction 
and reduced marginal tax rates, this increase to charitable cash 
contributions seems little more than a wink and a nod to the country’s 
wealthiest denizens. Not only are households who make significant 
charitable donations undeterred by the increased standard deductions 
because itemizing is more advantageous to them but they also can now 
contribute even more cash to nonprofits of their choice and are entitled 
to claim a larger deduction for doing so. As one study notes, fewer 
“than 10[%] of households—mainly those at the highest income levels” 
are now likely to claim the deduction.40 This unfortunate reality has led 
to a great deal of criticism. As one economist observed, “A deduction 
that is only available to the most affluent donors cannot pass the laugh 
37 Id. at 88. 
38 Brill & Choe, supra note 34, at 3. 
39 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(G)(i). 
40 JOSEPH ROSENBERG & EUGENE STEUERLE, TAX POL’Y CTR., REFORMING 
CHARITABLE TAX INCENTIVES: ASSESSING EVIDENCE AND POLICY OPTIONS 4 (2018). 
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test for political sustainability.”41 Other commentators have expressed 
concern with depriving other citizens of an “incentive to engage and 
give more to their communities.”42 
One other change in the Code worth noting is the newly imposed tax 
for nonprofits on employee transportation fringe benefits.43 Section 
501(b) allows that any 501(c) corporation may be subjected to a tax for 
unrelated business activities.44 Nonprofits are tax exempt if they are 
engaging in conduct which justifies their exemption status.45 However, 
after 2017, 
the TCJA disallows deductions for certain fringe benefits, including 
transportation-related benefits and parking benefits. Since for-profit 
businesses are no longer allowed to deduct these expenses as a result 
of other changes in the TCJA, in an effort to create parity, tax-exempt 
organizations are required to add the value of these fringe benefits 
provided to employees to their unrelated business taxable income. 
Increasing unrelated business taxable income by the amount of fringe 
benefits effectively requires tax-exempt entities to pay the corporate 
tax rate of 21% on the value of these benefits as provided. For some 
organizations that did not previously file Form 990s, particularly 
churches, this change could require that information returns be 
filed.46 
This new policy places nonprofits in a catch-22. Either they discontinue 
certain fringe benefits for employees, risking employee dissatisfaction, 
or they must pay a tax and likely take time to learn how to file a Form 
990. Both options will likely produce economic burdens upon the
nonprofit and detract from focus on its actual tax-exempt purpose.
Having outlined some of the key changes under the TCJA, Part III now
turns to look at the corresponding effects of those changes.
41 Viard, supra note 32, at 90 (citing Eugene Steuerle, Charities Have Plenty of 
Opportunity to Advance Giving Despite Tax Law Losses, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 8, 
2018). 
42 Id. (citing David Rogers, GOP Tax Law a One-Two Punch to Charities – and 
American Giving, POLITICO, Jan. 13, 2018).  
43 But see Tankersley & Cochrane, supra note 24 (discussing the House of 
Representatives’ recent attempt to correct for these issues). 
44 I.R.C. § 501(b). 
45 GRAVELLE ET AL., supra note 23, at 3. 
46 Id. at 4. 
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III 
IMPACTS UPON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND 
CORRESPONDING EFFECTS 
Part III looks at several impacts these changes within the TCJA have 
on society. First, it explores some of the data surrounding impacts on 
the nonprofit sector. Second, it focuses on the connection between 
changes within the TCJA and their effects on income inequality. Third, 
it highlights how these effects are correlated to worse health outcomes 
for both vulnerable populations and the larger society. Finally, it 
concludes with a few illustrations of real-world impacts. 
A. Giving Inequality and the Sectors Most Affected
Due to changes under the TCJA, overall contributions to nonprofits 
were expected to decrease. One study predicted a $15 billion reduction 
in 2018, while another estimated closer to $17.2 billion, and yet another 
suggested anywhere from $13 to $21 billion annually.47 As already 
discussed, contributions going forward will likely be larger and 
concentrated in the hands of fewer donors. The effect of 
disincentivizing charitable contributions for all but the highest income 
households results in what is known as giving inequality, a concept that 
also extends to the disproportionate burden placed on small nonprofits 
when massive reductions in giving incentives occur.48 
Researchers have noted that some nonprofits are likely to be hit 
harder than others by changes under the TCJA. Low-income donors, 
for example, have historically been the biggest contributors to small, 
local nonprofits “such as food banks, homeless shelters, and social-
service [providers].”49 However, smaller earners are not the only 
donors worth noting here. Of particular significance are upper-middle-
class donors, who will experience the biggest shift from itemizing 
deductions to taking the standard deduction. This group of donors also 
favors organizations such as “food banks and social-services groups.”50 
These smaller, locally funded nonprofits are thus the ones that will 
struggle the most. Meanwhile, wealthy donors favor universities and 
47 ROSENBERG & STEUERLE, supra note 40, at 2; Brill & Choe, supra note 34, at 1; 
NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, supra note 26, at 26. 
48 NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, supra note 26, at 29. 
49 Id. 
50 Viard, supra note 32, at 90 (citing Richard Rubin, Charities Brace for Tax-Driven 
Drop in Year-End Giving, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2018) (internal quotations omitted). 
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the arts, so these institutions should continue relatively unscathed.51 It 
is also worth mentioning that some economists suggest wealthy donors 
favor hospitals and the health sector, too, yet by failing to support 
“religion, youth and family services, community improvement, and 
directly providing for basic necessities,”52 one can easily extrapolate 
that giving money to hospitals does not necessarily curtail other 
negative socioeconomic and health outcomes. Although hospitals treat 
patients in need, they function more as a Band-Aid for health crises, 
whereas nonprofits aimed at alleviating poverty, homelessness, 
addiction/mental health issues, and food scarcity serve valuable 
interventionist purposes to prevent individuals from being 
hospitalized—or worse.53 
Initial data suggest that many of these predictions are coming true. 
For example, individual donations in 2018 totaled $292.09 billion—an 
overall reduction of 3.4% when adjusted for inflation.54 When looking 
at donations from all sources, charitable giving to health organizations 
declined by 2.3% after adjusting for inflation.55 Other sectors in the 
charitable community that saw fewer donations include religion, 
education, foundations, and public-society benefit organizations.56 
While these percentages may seem small, their magnitude becomes 
clearer when considering that poverty rates experienced only a 0.2% 
reduction under the TCJA. 
B. Effects on Income Inequality
Different stories regarding the TCJA’s impact on income inequality 
emerge depending on which metrics are used. For example, from a 
purely income-based approach, the Congressional Research Service 
“estimates that the TCJA reduced overall poverty by 1.6% (from 12.5% 
in poverty under the pre-TCJA income tax to 12.3% in poverty under 
51 Id. For a deeper discussion of giving inequality, see Miranda Perry Fleischer, How Is 
the Opera Like a Soup Kitchen?, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TAX LAW 255 
(Monica Bhandari ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2017). 
52 Viard, supra note 32, at 90; GRAVELLE ET AL., supra note 23, at 27–28. 
53 For a discussion of the shortcomings healthcare providers face in treating hospital 
patients, see John T. James, A New, Evidence-Based Estimate of Patient Harms Associated 
with Hospital Care, 9 J. PATIENT SAFETY 3, 122–28 (2013). 
54 GIVING USA, Giving USA 2019: Americans Gave $427.71 Billion to Charity in 2018 
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the post-TCJA income tax).”57 However, merely because a household 
has enough posttax income to lift them above the poverty threshold 
does not mean they are no longer struggling, nor does it mean they are 
able to absorb the cost of fewer social service programs available to 
them. Further, the households who experienced these changes in 
poverty rates were primarily low-income families with children and 
working family members.58 Individuals who do not fit this category 
experienced virtually no change in their poverty rates under the 
TCJA.59 Authors with the Congressional Research Service further 
distinguish between the poverty gap and the poverty rate, noting 
that the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and housing assistance programs 
each had a greater effect on reducing the poverty gap than did the 
TCJA.60 This distinction is noteworthy because it again highlights the 
important gap that nonprofits with similar purposes strive to fill. 
Changes made under the TCJA risk worsening income inequality 
eventually, and a weakened nonprofit sector will be less capable of 
responding to societal needs. While the TCJA may have resulted in a 
slight reduction in the poverty rate, this is hardly reassuring when 
considering that 40% of U.S. citizens are “one missed paycheck away 
from poverty.”61 Further, nonprofits are already struggling to meet the 
needs of the public, with 57% reporting an inability to meet demand—
meanwhile, that figure rises to 65% for nonprofits serving low-income 
populations.62 Despite this troubling landscape, the outlook worsens 
when considering how Congress will afford to offset the costs of the 
TCJA’s tax cuts. 
Congress must inevitably recover the revenue lost due to recent tax 
cuts. As William R. Cline of the Peterson Institute notes, 
The scope for a regressive impact of the new tax law becomes much 
larger once one considers possible scenarios for recovering lost 
revenue. It is useful to consider the consequences of spending cuts 
distributed proportionally the same as one major social safety-net 
program: Medicaid. This illustration is neither extreme nor arbitrary, 
considering that the House Republican leadership has already 
57 CRANDALL-HOLLICK ET AL., supra note 3, at 13. 
58 Id. at 13–14. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 17–18. 
61 Aimee Picchi, 40% of Americans Only One Missed Paycheck Away from Poverty, 
C.B.S. NEWS (Jan. 29, 2019, 10:36 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/40-of-americans
-one-step-from-poverty-if-they-miss-a-paycheck [https://perma.cc/WQ9Y-ANC9].
62 NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, supra note 26, at 24.
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specifically mentioned healthcare and anti-poverty programs as areas 
of public spending that will need to be cut.63 
Mr. Cline runs calculations using a $1 trillion spending cut to Medicaid 
spread across ten years.64 The overall outcome is that the bottom 60% 
of taxpayers come out worse under the TCJA; the 60–80% range 
remains essentially unchanged, and the top 20% experience a gain.65 
While Medicaid is the example used here (and is a relatively pertinent 
one when considering health outcomes), this same issue arises for any 
social welfare program that the government may cut. 
Furthermore, when the federal government makes budget cuts, the 
cascading effect of those budget cuts harms nonprofits. Traditionally, 
states receive approximately one-third of their funds from the federal 
government.66 Likewise, local or municipal governments rely on state 
and federal funding, and nonprofits are often hired by these various 
levels of government “to deliver programs and services to the 
public.”67 Thus, not only are nonprofits, especially smaller nonprofits, 
likely to receive fewer charitable contributions from taxpayers, they are 
also heavily affected by unforeseen cuts in public spending.68 The 
TCJA’s increase of the standard deduction and its negligible effect on 
poverty rates is the equivalent of putting a Band-Aid on a gaping 
wound. Further, this overall negative impact on income inequality has 
corresponding unfavorable results when looking at health outcomes. 
C. Effects on Societal Health
As has been hinted at, many changes discussed up to this point 
coalesce into worse health outcomes for society. Income inequality has 
long been linked with worse health outcomes for lower-income 
individuals. For example, low-income populations have significantly 
shorter life expectancies than their high-income counterparts and are 
more likely to suffer from costly health conditions such as obesity.69 
Because the TCJA will likely worsen income inequality, it is 
reasonable to assume that low-income communities will face worse 
health outcomes. It is also reasonable to conclude that when food banks 
63 CLINE, supra note 12, at 6. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 7. 
66 NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, supra note 26, at 27. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Roberta F. Mann, Controlling the Environmental Costs of Obesity, 47 ENV’T L. 697, 
703–04 (2017). 
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and social service programs lack funding—whether that funding is 
derived from direct charitable contributions or allocated through the 
federal budget—low-income individuals are likely to face serious 
hardships that will challenge their health. Whether the issue be food 
scarcity, housing scarcity, or even a lack of rehabilitative services like 
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings at the local church, community 
health will inevitably suffer absent such services. 
The increasing marginalization of the elderly and disabled also 
imposes significant burdens on societal health. That the TCJA lifts 
some families with children and workers above the poverty threshold 
while leaving all others behind is particularly troubling—especially 
when combined with the likelihood these tax cuts will be paid for by 
slashing funding for benefit programs.70 To further complicate matters, 
while one in five U.S. citizens are now fifty-five or older, by the year 
2030 that proportion is expected to rise to one in three due to the baby 
boomer generation and decreasing fertility rates.71 And, unfortunately, 
disparities in wealth and income have become increasingly pronounced 
over the past thirty years and carry over into old age.72 Thus, while an 
older household in the bottom 20% had an average annual income of 
$9,000 in 1989 and $14,000 in 2016, older households in the top 20% 
averaged $242,000 in 1989 and $398,000 in 2016.73 The top 20% 
experienced a 64% increase in their annual incomes, while the bottom 
20% saw a 55% increase.74 Taken with the fact that the number of 
uninsured individuals in the U.S. is on the rise, these figures paint a 
bleak picture for the health outcomes in some of the nation’s most 
vulnerable populations. 
Nor are the consequences limited to low-income populations. Recent 
research studying income inequality and health suggests that greater 
inequality also has an adverse effect on those in the highest income 
classes.75 The data collected is reproduced in Figure 1.76 
Viewing states and nations, the data finds correlations between 
income inequality and rates of heart failure, life expectancy, infant 
70 See CLINE, supra note 12, at 6–7. 
71 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-587, RETIREMENT SECURITY: INCOME 
AND WEALTH DISPARITIES CONTINUE THROUGH OLD AGE 7 (2019). 
72 Id. at 9. 
73 Id. at 9–10. 
74 Id. 
75 See INEQUALITY.ORG, FACTS: INEQUALITY AND HEALTH, https://inequality.org/facts 
/inequality-and-health/#us-inequality-health [https://perma.cc/D665-SYKR] (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2019). 
76 Id. 
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mortality, and less tangible measures like stress and happiness.77 For 
example, analyzing data from the Journal of the American Medical 
Association and the U.S. Census Bureau, researchers break down U.S. 
states by their Gini coefficient score (a measure of income inequality) 
and life expectancy.78 Mississippi occupies one end of the spectrum 
with a high Gini coefficient of 0.4799 and low life expectancy of 74.7 
years, while Hawaii occupies the other end with a low Gini coefficient 
of 0.4369 and high life expectancy of 81.3 years; similar trends can be 
observed at the international level, too.79 As another study notes, 
“Income inequality harms health directly by increasing the prevalence 
of poverty and causing chronic stress due to social comparisons. 
Furthermore, it harms health indirectly by eroding societal trust and 
destabilizing communities.”80 This shows that while income inequality 
primarily leads to poor health outcomes for low-income populations, it 
also takes a physical and psychic toll upon the overall health of states 
and nations. 
Figure 1. There is a correlation between a state’s equitability and 
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It is hardly a secret that financial insecurity and instability lead to 
worse health outcomes. By exacerbating wealth inequalities and 
weakening support systems for the most vulnerable populations, the 
TCJA threatens the health of our society. Further, it does so at a time 
when the number of uninsured individuals is on the rise. Even if 
diminished societal trust and community stability are not in and of 
themselves unduly harmful, there remains the problem of worsening 
health outcomes for low-income and marginalized communities, who 
are likely the same individuals losing insurance coverage, and then 
offsetting those costs to taxpayers. If the current administration is as 
concerned as it claims to be with the burden that uninsured individuals 
have on the healthcare system and taxpayers’ pocketbooks, then it 
should correct for flaws in its tax policies that exacerbate these 
problems. The following subsection examines how these problems are 
affecting real nonprofits. 
D. Case Studies
Several real-world impacts are identifiable in the news and media. 
As individuals’ charitable habits evolve and organizations struggle to 
keep pace with the demands of the current administration, numerous 
nonprofits are closing. For example, the Los Angeles–based Youth 
Policy Institute recently announced its closure in October 2019, leading 
to a layoff of roughly 1,000 employees.81 During its operation, the 
organization had “secured tens of millions of dollars for after-school 
programs, job training, tax preparation and other services targeting 
low-income families.”82 While the organization likely saw a reduction 
in charitable giving from individuals, the real death blow came from 
the Department of Education withholding $6 million in funding.83 This 
illustration confirms Mr. Cline’s fear that the federal government 
would target programs aimed at alleviating poverty to help finance the 
TCJA. 
A second example further illustrates the trickle-down effect of 
reduced funding making its way to nonprofits. In 2017, the year the 
TCJA was passed, Montana saw $18 million in Medicaid cuts and a 
total reduction of $95 million in funding for its Department of Public 
81 David Zahniser & Howard Blume, This Group Was Supposed to Help L.A. Tackle 
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Health and Human Services.84 These budget cuts crippled the mental 
health and addiction services within the state, resulting in numerous 
closures, especially in more rural areas.85 The effect was that providers 
and case workers suffered job losses and their patients either went 
without treatment or, if they were homeless, were displaced to more 
urban parts of the state.86 This resulted in greater demands on both 
healthcare and affordable housing providers, while also introducing 
greater risk of crime and alcohol and drug abuse in those 
communities.87 One can see that nonprofits need every dollar they can 
get these days. Further, the TCJA has caused significant harm by 
reducing the charitable giving incentive while simultaneously slashing 
social welfare programs to finance tax cuts for the rich. 
Finally, even urban areas cannot maintain the skyrocketing demands 
placed on nonprofits. Peace for the Streets by Kids from the Streets 
(PSKS) is a homeless shelter for youth in Seattle, founded by Zackary 
Tutwiler—a former homeless youth himself.88 It is facing closure 
because of insufficient funds, both from individual donors and the 
state.89 In a community with 1,089 homeless youth, losing twenty-five 
beds during winter months is significant.90 Neither rural nor urban 
areas can keep up with the demand, and in the face of these closures, 
the individuals displaced face increased risks of hospitalization, 
institutionalization, or incarceration—each of which places significant 
costs on the community and individuals affected. 
IV 
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
A variety of potential fixes have been proposed for the problems 
raised; Part IV takes each in turn. First, it discusses a nonrefundable tax 
credit for charitable contributions. Second, it explores the feasibility of 
an above-the-line deduction for charitable contributions. Third, it looks 
at the Economic Mobility Act of 2019 as a potential solution to the 
84 Kianna Gardner, Mental-Health in Montana’s Frontier: Budget Cuts in 2017 
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problem nonprofits now face regarding employee fringe benefits. 
Finally, it concludes by suggesting the I.R.S. increase its audits of 
wealthy taxpayers to finance the charitable contribution deduction. 
A. Credits
One alternative to removing the itemizable deduction for charitable 
contributions is to implement a tax credit as a substitute. Substituting a 
tax credit for the deduction may help spread the giving incentive across 
all income levels without losing revenue.91 Two economists, working 
with a flat-rate 25% nonrefundable tax credit that the Congressional 
Budget Office previously analyzed, concluded that it could 
significantly incentivize giving for individuals “in the lower 90 percent 
of the income distribution.”92 Unfortunately, this same tax credit, 
without a floor (i.e., a minimum contribution amount below which the 
credit could not be claimed), would also be one of the costliest options 
to implement. The floorless, nonrefundable tax credit would cost an 
estimated $31.1 billion in revenue and produce an estimated increase 
of $23.3 billion in charitable giving.93 With a floor of $500 for single 
filers and $1,000 for married filing jointly, the figures change to a $15.4 
billion revenue expense and $20 billion increase in charitable giving.94 
Even if the government allocated revenue from somewhere else to 
finance this tax credit, it contains a more significant flaw. 
Using a 25% tax credit, while encouraging lower-income 
contributions, would disincentivize high-income donors from giving. 
Anyone with a marginal tax rate above 25% would now have “a higher 
price of giving.”95 Because high-income donors make significant 
charitable contributions, any disincentive to give could have large 
ramifications and should be avoided. In addition, by incentivizing the 
lowest 90% of households to claim the credit, it would reduce the 
administrability of the policy by “increas[ing] complexity in 
compliance and tax administration.”96 In light of these shortcomings, 
other policy alternatives are worth exploring. 
91 GRAVELLE ET AL., supra note 23, at 34. 




96 GRAVELLE ET AL., supra note 23, at 34. 
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B. Above-the-Line Deductions
From a fiscal standpoint, an above-the-line deduction for charitable 
contributions may be the most pragmatic option when considering its 
effects. “A credit directly reduces tax liability, while a deduction . . . 
reduces tax liability only indirectly—by reducing taxable income.”97 
Compared to a nonrefundable tax credit, for example, the estimated 
cost of an above-the-line deduction with a $500 floor for single filers 
and $1,000 floor for married filing jointly is only $14.6 billion 
(approximately half the cost of the floorless, nonrefundable tax 
credit).98 This would produce an estimated increase of $19.1 billion in 
charitable giving.99 These numbers, however, are not so different from 
the projections for the nonrefundable tax credit provision with the same 
$500/$1,000 floors. Thus, consider how a credit and an above-the-line 
deduction differ in terms of which donors they are incentivizing. 
Whereas the tax credit effectively incentivizes contributions from 
people with a marginal tax rate of 25% or less and disincentivizes 
contributions for those over that threshold, “[u]nder an above-the-line 
deduction, the marginal rate of the charitable incentive would still be 
based on the taxpayer’s bracket . . . . Moreover, there would still be no 
giving incentive for households too poor to owe individual income 
tax.”100 In effect, this means that high-income donors would keep their 
increased incentive to give, while lower-income donors might not be 
as incentivized, thus failing to completely resolve concerns over giving 
inequality. 
Despite these disparate impacts, nonrefundable tax credits and 
above-the-line deductions share many commonalities. For example, 
just as a nonrefundable tax credit would reduce administrability, adding 
a new above-the-line deduction that all taxpayers could claim would 
have the same result.101 As already mentioned, the above-the-line 
deduction also creates incentive issues based on income class and 
would perpetuate the current “giving inequality” already in place under 
the TCJA. However, while the TCJA has lowered by percentage the 
number of poor and nonpoor households that owe taxes at the end of 
the year,102 it still stands to reason that an above-the-line deduction 
97 RICHARD SCHMALBECK ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 14 (Rachel E. Barkow 
et al. eds., 5th ed. 2018). 
98 Brill & Choe, supra note 34, at 7. 
99 Id. 
100 Viard, supra note 32, at 91. 
101 GRAVELLE ET AL., supra note 23, at 33. 
102 CRANDALL-HOLLICK ET AL., supra note 3, at 12. 
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would incentivize giving among a broader base of lower-middle- to 
high-income earners. For those individuals that do have tax liabilities, 
an above-the-line deduction is a powerful tool to incentivize giving as 
it may help lower that household’s overall marginal tax rate. A 
nonrefundable tax credit, on the other hand, might lower the 
household’s tax liability (if one is owed) and thereby lower its average 
tax rate.103 Ultimately, either solution would be an improvement over 
the current system and help restore the giving incentive to those who 
may have switched from itemizing their deductions. 
C. The Nonprofit Tax Relief Act of 2019 (H.R. 3323) and the
Economic Mobility Act of 2019 (H.R. 3300) 
As noted earlier, one other area in which reform is needed is the 
TCJA’s changed treatment of certain fringe benefits and unrelated 
business income for nonprofits. I.R.C. §§ 512(a)(6)–(7) now impose 
additional burdens on nonprofits, treating them instead as if they are 
for-profit businesses.104 For example, under § 512(a)(6) “unrelated 
business taxable income, including for purposes of determining any net 
operating loss deduction, shall be computed separately with respect to 
each such trade or business[,]”105 thereby disallowing any aggregation 
between jointly operated nonprofits. Additionally, § 512(a)(7) now 
requires that unrelated business taxable income be increased by the 
amount of certain (previously deductible) employee fringe benefits, 
such as transportation, parking passes, or athletic facilities.106 Congress 
justified these changes by suggesting “the tax would ‘make the tax 
system simpler and fairer for all businesses.’”107 Because Congress 
made similar changes in the Code for for-profit business, it presumably 
considered it fair to hold nonprofits to the same standards. 
Many commentators, however, have objected to this rationale. For 
example, Professor Roger Colinvaux writes that “‘fair’ or equal 
treatment between a nonprofit when performing its nonprofit functions 
and a for-profit business makes no sense. There is not meant to be a 
level playing field, which is why nonprofits get tax exemptions in the 
103 CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: MARGINAL AND 
AVERAGE TAX RATES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-marginal-and-average 
-tax-rates [https://perma.cc/3Z2N-6AKE] (last updated June 21, 2019).
104 See I.R.C. §§ 512(a)(6)–(7).
105 I.R.C. § 512(a)(6). 
106 I.R.C. § 512(a)(7). 
107 Roger Colinvaux, Fixing Philanthropy: A Vision for Charitable Giving and Reform, 
TAX NOTES 1007, 1014 (2019) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 115-409, at 266). 
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first place.”108 Considering that nonprofits do not operate for profit, it 
seems odd to treat them as equivalent to for-profit businesses. There is 
also the added and unforeseen consequence mentioned earlier, wherein 
many nonprofits are now learning (or being told) that they must file 
Form 990 for the first time, which is undoubtedly undermining 
Congress’s goal of making the tax system simpler. 
To address these concerns, numerous pieces of legislation have been 
advanced. Two such pieces of legislation include the Nonprofit Tax 
Relief Act of 2019 (H.R. 3323) and the Economic Mobility Act of 2019 
(H.R. 3300).109 The Nonprofit Tax Relief Act “would eliminate the 
separate business calculation of the UBIT [unrelated business income 
tax],” while the Economic Mobility Act “would, among other things, 
repeal the inclusion of certain fringe benefits in UBIT.”110 In sum, 
these pieces of legislation would effectively return nonprofits to the tax 
exempt treatment they received before enactment of the TCJA. 
Congress should seriously consider both measures to alleviate the 
burdens nonprofits now face due to its enactment. 
D. Increasing I.R.S. Compliance and Enforcement
To fund either a tax credit or an above-the-line deduction for 
charitable contributions, the I.R.S. should increase its compliance and 
enforcement efforts. Compliance and enforcement enable the agency 
to audit and collect on underreported or underpaid taxes. The rate at 
which millionaires are audited has dropped roughly 80% from 2011 to 
2018.111 This is in part because the agency has experienced large 
budget cuts of $3 billion since 2010, resulting in positions being lost 
through attrition and a brain drain on the agency as talented auditors 
retire.112 While this solution therefore would take some time and 
money to implement, it is a worthwhile endeavor. The I.R.S. and its 
auditors serve to deter dishonest behavior and make sure that everyone 
is paying their fair share—breathing new life into its compliance and 
108 Id. 
109 GRAVELLE ET AL., supra note 23, at 39. 
110 Id. 
111 Paul Kiel, It’s Getting Worse: The IRS Now Audits Poor Americans at About 
the Same Rate as the Top 1%, PROPUBLICA (May 30, 2019, 10:16 AM), https://www 
.propublica.org/article/irs-now-audits-poor-americans-at-about-the-same-rate-as-the-top-1 
-percent [https://perma.cc/7CXS-GMH2].
112 Jesse Eisinger & Paul Kiel, Why the Rich Don’t Get Audited, N.Y. TIMES (May 3,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/sunday-review/tax-rich-irs.html [https://
perma.cc/AUK5-UJ53]; Kiel, supra note 111.
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enforcement department would ensure that the agency has adequate 
talent for generations to come. 
Further, this endeavor would pay for itself and the costs of financing 
the nonrefundable tax credit or above-the-line deduction for the 
charitable contribution. It has been estimated that the top 0.5% “of the 
highest-earning Americans account for about a fifth of the income 
that’s hidden from the I.R.S. . . . or more than $50 billion a year in 
today’s dollars.”113 While there is no guarantee that the I.R.S. could 
collect this amount, this represents only a fraction of the revenues that 
go unreported or unpaid every year. In fact, the I.R.S. estimated this tax 
gap to run closer to the tune of $245 billion for income tax in 2001.114 
In support of this, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that 
once new employees are hired and trained at the I.R.S., each dollar of 
funding devoted to the agency would yield five dollars in revenue 
collected, and other sources have suggested even more favorable 
results.115 Thus, by prioritizing compliance and enforcement actions 
for the highest earners, the I.R.S. may help strengthen the fairness of 
the current tax system and defend against future attempts to erode it. 
Further, this reform would easily pay for a charitable contribution 
credit or above-the-line deduction. 
CONCLUSION 
To recap, the number of uninsured individuals is on the rise while 
nonprofits charged with providing services to aid at-risk populations 
are seeing reduced charitable contributions. The TCJA and other 
policies of the Trump administration are largely to blame. On the 
surface, the TCJA may not immediately appear to worsen income 
inequality—but by slashing funding elsewhere, the legislation 
produces drastic effects, as evidenced by giving inequality and the 
several closures of community-based nonprofits. These closures shift 
tax burdens to hospitals, mental institutions, law enforcement, and 
113 Kiel, supra note 111 (citing Andrew Johns & Joel Slemrod, The Distribution of 
Income Tax Noncompliance, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 397, 404 (2010)). 
114 Rosemary D. Marcuss, Understanding Compliance: What’s the Tax Gap Got to Do 
With It?, TAX NOTES 887, 888 (2011). 
115 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, INCREASE APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE’S ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES, https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2018/54826 
[https://perma.cc/2W2D-FBV5] (2018); Lawrence H. Summers & Natasha Sarin, Yes, Our 
Tax System Needs Reform. Let’s Start with This First Step., WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2019, 
3:46 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/yes-our-tax-system-needs-reform 
-lets-start-with-this-first-step/2019/11/17/4d23f8d4-07dd-11ea-924a-28d87132c7ec_story.
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incarceration systems. Accordingly, the TCJA has reduced the fairness, 
efficiency, and administrability of the tax system. 
To help remedy the situation, a few steps should be taken. Congress 
should create either a nonrefundable tax credit or above-the-line 
deduction for charitable contributions to restore the charitable giving 
incentive. Congress should also enact H.R. 3323 and H.R. 3300 to 
reverse the additional administrative burdens imposed on nonprofits 
and the I.R.S. by the TCJA. Finally, funds should be appropriated to 
increase compliance and enforcement at the I.R.S.—an endeavor that, 
while initially costing a little money upfront, will produce significant 
payouts and help restore equity to the tax system in the long term. 
POSTSCRIPT 
In the time since this Comment was written, the COVID-19 
pandemic has spread across the global community, overwhelming 
healthcare systems in many nations, including the United States. The 
crisis has further exacerbated a number of issues raised in this 
Comment. For example, the size of the most vulnerable populations in 
the U.S. is rapidly increasing, and nonprofits are struggling more than 
ever to meet demand. Additionally, as the economy reacts to the 
pandemic and layoffs soar, lower- and middle-income households, 
already lacking a tax incentive to make charitable contributions, now 
have an increased sense of self-preservation that discourages charitable 
giving. Further, fundraising events and galas—prime sources of 
donations for nonprofits—are being canceled to slow the spread of the 
disease.  
The situation is expected to get far worse before it begins to improve, 
and it is already dire. Nonprofits have been negotiating with Congress 
for $60 billion in additional funding; they are also imploring Congress 
to allow every taxpayer a reduction in tax liability for each dollar 
contributed to a nonprofit—regardless of whether those taxpayers 
itemize their deductions.116 Congress has responded by passing the 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, which 
temporarily allows “[t]axpayers who do not itemize their deductions 
[to] take a one-time deduction of up to $300 for gifts made to charitable 
organizations.”117 A modest change for an immodest problem. 
116 Naomi Jagoda, Charities Seek $60B in Stimulus Funding Due to Coronavirus, THE 
HILL (Mar. 18, 2020, 11:27 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/488212-charities-seek 
-60b-in-stimulus-funding-due-to-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/HW7M-4M6Q].
117 The CARES Act: Charitable Giving Incentives, AFP NEWS (Apr. 10, 2020), https://
afpglobal.org/news/cares-act-charitable-giving-incentives [https://perma.cc/BY5E-H85V].
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Meanwhile, those hit hardest by the virus and the economic downturn 
are the elderly, those with chronic health conditions, and those of low 
socioeconomic status.118 For example, the homeless population is 
twice as likely to contract and spread the coronavirus to others.119 
While Congress is acting to pass relief packages,120 such as providing 
for free testing and treatment for those afflicted with the virus, hospitals 
and nonprofits are inadequately equipped to meet the demand.121 The 
State of Washington, faced with its inability to treat everyone, 
established guidelines to decide which patients should receive priority 
for life-saving treatment.122 Now, more than ever, the nation is relying 
on its nonprofits; now, more than ever, Congress needs to create an 
above-the-line deduction for charitable contributions, ensuring that the 
wealthy and poor alike are equally incentivized to donate to nonprofits. 
As the nation is gripped by food shortages, lack of sanitary supplies, 
and a skyrocketing need for beds to house the infected, community-
based nonprofits are uniquely positioned to provide these services. 
Because these same nonprofits are disfavored by the wealthy, though, 
and because no tax incentive exists for anyone else to donate to them, 
they are operating at diminished efficiency during this pandemic. 
Meanwhile, Congress is hemorrhaging money in its relief efforts and 
has proposed even more corporate tax cuts as one part of the 
solution.123 Now is the time, however, to make smart tax policy 
choices. Because nonprofits’ purpose is to fill in efficiency gaps for the 
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government, the first place to start is by correcting the charitable 
contribution deduction. By doing so, similar scenarios in the future may 
be mitigated. 
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